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	 Many	punishment	theorists	think	that	punishment	is	intentionally	harmful	and	that	
this	makes	it	especially	hard	to	justify	(e.g.,	Berman	2008:	266-7,	2012:	143,	Boonin	2008:	
6-17,	Gardner	2008:	xxxii,	xli,	Sayre-McCord	2001:	503-10,	Tadros	2011:	1,	265,	
Zimmerman	2011:	3-10,	164).1	But	explanations	for	the	latter	intuition	often	say	
questionable	things	about	the	significance	of	the	intent	to	harm.	This	makes	some	theorists	
doubt	the	intuition	(e.g.,	Chiao	2013:	733-747,	Enoch	2007:	73,	Kolber	2012:	7,	Ristroph	
2008:	1391-94,	Wringe	2019:	9-10).	I’ll	argue	that	there’s	another	way	to	explain	the	
intuition	–	call	it	the	target	intuition.	
	 Here’s	the	plan.	In	section	1,	I’ll	clarify	what	punishment	theorists	mean	when	they	
say	that	punishment	is	intentionally	harmful.	In	section	2,	I’ll	discuss	the	standard	
explanations	for	the	target	intuition,	identify	problems	with	them,	and	give	a	different	
explanation.	In	section	3,	I’ll	defend	my	explanation.	And	in	section	4,	I’ll	discuss	some	
implications	and	objections.	I’ll	just	assume	that	punishment	is	intentionally	harmful,	since	
that’s	the	dominant	view	in	the	literature	(cf.	Boonin	2008:	13-14,	n14; critics	of	the	view	
include	Kolber	2012,	Ristroph	2008:	1399-1400,	Sher	2009:	764,	and	Wringe	2013,	2019).	
1.	Clarifications	
In	this	section	I’ll	clarify	what	punishment	theorists	mean	when	they	say	that	
punishment	is	intentionally	harmful	(I	won’t	clarify	the	meaning	of	harmful	here,	since	
others	have	done	so,	e.g.,	Boonin	2008:	6-12).	And	I’ll	explain	why	getting	clear	on	this	is	
important.	Note	that	I’m	concerned	with	what	punishment	theorists	mean,	not	with	the	
 
1	Note	that	my	concern	is	with	moral	justification	specifically.	
	
nature	of	intention.	For	all	I’ll	say,	these	theorists	might	be	misusing	the	concept	of	
intention.	Nothing	important	to	my	discussion	will	turn	on	this.2	
There	are	at	least	two	ways	to	understand	the	claim	that	an	agent	intentionally	
harmed	a	subject	by	acting	in	some	way	(cf.	Scanlon	2008:	10-11,	Zimmerman	2011:	9-10).	
We	can	take	it	as	a	claim	about	what	the	agent	knew:	she	knew	that	her	act	would	harm	the	
subject	and	acted	anyway.	Or	we	can	take	it	as	a	claim	about	why	she	acted:	harming	the	
subject	was	one	of	her	motivating	reasons	for	acting.3	Punishment	theorists	who	say	that	
punishment	is	intentionally	harmful	mean	this	in	the	reasons-based	sense	(cf.	Gardner	
2008:	xxx,	n28).	There	are	two	pieces	of	evidence	for	this.	
First,	there’s	the	language	that	they	use	to	clarify	their	meaning.	For	example,	they	
say	that	punishment	is	imposed	‘because’	it’s	harmful,	that	it’s	imposed	‘in	order	to’	harm,	
and	that	its	harmfulness	is	‘essential’	to	it,	not	an	‘incidental’	or	‘accidental’	or	merely	
‘foreseeable’	‘side	effect’	of	it	(for	discussion	and	references	see	Boonin	2008:	13	and	
Sayre-McCord	2001:	503-4).	These	are	just	less	explicit	ways	of	saying	that	punishment	is	
intentionally	harmful	in	the	reasons-based	sense.	
Second,	there’s	the	standard	argument	that	punishment	theorists	give	for	the	
intentions	claim.	Here’s	a	paraphrase	of	the	argument	(cf.	Berman	2012:	142-3,	Boonin	
2008:	12-15,	Honderich	1969:	1,	Ten	1987:	15,	Wasserstrom	1982:	476,	Zimmerman	2011:	
9-10).	
 
2	Thanks	to	a	referee	for	pressing	me	here.	
3	Note	that	this	doesn’t	mean	that	the	agent	inflicts	harm	for	its	own	sake.	She	might	inflict	it	because	she	
thinks	that	it	will	have	good	effects	(cf.	Boonin	2008:	14,	Chiao	2013:	733,	Enoch	2007:	70,	Sayre-McCord	
2001:	504,	Zimmerman	2011:	10).	
	
It’s	possible	to	treat	two	people	in	comparably	harmful	ways	for	similar	reasons	and	
only	punish	one	of	them.	For	example,	it’s	possible	to	confine	two	people	because	
they’re	killers	and	only	punish	one	of	them.	That’s	what	we’re	typically	doing	when	
we	imprison	a	culpable	killer	and	commit	a	non-culpable	mentally	ill	killer	in	a	
psychiatric	institution.	The	intentions	claim	is	necessary	to	distinguish	punitive	
from	non-punitive	treatment	in	such	cases.	So	it’s	true.	
Such	arguments	are	valid	only	if	the	intentions	claim	is	meant	in	the	reasons-based	sense.	
This	is	because	the	forms	of	treatment	being	compared	are	all	intentionally	harmful	in	the	
knowledge-based	sense.	The	fact	that	punishment	theorists	defend	the	intentions	claim	in	
this	way	shows	that	they’re	using	the	reasons-based	sense.	
Getting	clear	on	this	is	important	because	it’s	tempting	to	think	that	punishing	
people	is	just	a	matter	of	treating	them	in	harmful	ways	–	subjecting	them	to	so-called	hard	
treatment	–	in	response	to	their	failings	(Feinberg	1965:	397	rejects	this	view	but	suggests	
that	it’s	common; he	also	seems	to	have	popularized	the	term	hard	treatment).	On	this	
simple	view,	we	punish	people	when	we	do	things	like	fine	or	confine	them	for	wrongdoing	
or	rule	breaking.	If	the	simple	view	is	true,	justifying	punishment	is	only	a	matter	of	
justifying	these	ways	of	using	hard	treatment	(among	others,	Wellman	2012	frames	the	
task	of	justifying	punishment	in	this	way).	But	if	the	intentions	claim	is	true,	the	simple	
view	is	false.	We	can	use	hard	treatment	in	such	ways	without	punishing	because	we	can	
do	it	without	intending	harm.	To	illustrate,	we	can	fine	thieves	just	to	compensate	their	
victims	or	confine	killers	just	to	protect	others	from	them	(cf.	Boonin	2008:	213-76,	
Gardner	2008:	xxxi-xxxii,	Sayre-McCord	2001:	508-9,	Zimmerman	2011:	165-75).	The	
target	intuition	says	that	this	matters	morally:	other	things	equal,	it’s	harder	to	justify	
	
inflicting	hard	treatment	with	the	intent	to	harm	than	without.	That	is,	justifying	
punishment	requires	justifying	both	hard	treatment	and	the	intent	to	harm	(cf.	Berman	
2012:	143).	
Next,	I’ll	present	the	standard	explanations	for	the	target	intuition,	raise	some	
problems	for	them,	and	give	another	explanation.	
2.	Explanations	–	Part	I	
	 There	are	two	standard	explanations	for	the	target	intuition	(advocates	of	one	or	
both	include	Berman	2008:	267,	279-81,	Boonin	2008:	15-16,	28-9,	234,	Gardner	2008:	
xxxi-xxxiv,	xl-xli,	Sayre-McCord	2001:	507,	Tadros	2011:	1,	139-66,	and	Zimmerman	2011:	
159-65).	Here’s	a	paraphrase	of	the	first	explanation.	
Intentions	Can	Affect	Permissibility	Directly:	Other	things	equal,	bad	intentions	
can	make	an	otherwise	permissible	act	impermissible.	The	intent	to	harm	is	a	
presumptively	very	bad	intention.	It	makes	punishment	especially	hard	to	justify	by	
threatening	to	make	punishment	impermissible	in	this	way.	
Advocates	of	this	explanation	point	to	cases	where	they	think	intentions	affect	
permissibility	directly.	Here’s	such	a	case:	a	pilot	fighting	a	just	war	bombs	a	key	enemy	
weapons	facility	knowing	that	this	will	kill	an	innocent	civilian	(Boonin	2008:	16).	Some	
theorists	think	that	the	pilot’s	intentions	can	affect	whether	she	acts	permissibly.	They	
think	that,	other	things	equal,	she	acts	permissibly	if	she	just	intends	to	destroy	the	facility	
and	impermissibly	if	she	intends	to	kill	the	civilian.	Advocates	of	the	first	explanation	say	
that	the	intent	to	harm	can	make	punishment	impermissible	in	the	same	way.	For	example,	
they	worry	that	punitive	confinement	can	be	impermissible	even	in	cases	where	
comparably	harmful	non-punitive	confinement	would	be	permissible.	
	
For	reasons	that	I’ll	get	to,	some	advocates	of	the	target	intuition	doubt	this	
explanation.	So	they’ve	given	another	one.	Here’s	a	paraphrase	of	it.	
Intentions	Can	Affect	Permissibility	Indirectly:	Whether	an	act	is	permissible	
depends	on	its	effects,	which	depend	on	its	intentions.	Other	things	equal,	the	intent	
to	harm	is	likely	to	make	a	harmful	act	more	harmful	than	it	would	otherwise	be.	
More	harmful	acts	are	more	likely	to	be	impermissible.	The	intent	to	harm	makes	
punishment	especially	hard	to	justify	by	threatening	to	make	it	impermissibly	
harmful.	
Advocates	of	this	explanation	point	to	cases	where	they	think	intentions	affect	
permissibility	indirectly.	Here’s	such	a	case:	the	authorities	confine	a	dangerous	person,	
thereby	harming	her.	In	one	version	of	the	case,	they	merely	intend	to	protect	others	from	
her.	In	a	second	version,	they	intend	to	harm	her	(Boonin	2008:	234).	Some	theorists	think	
that	she’ll	likely	be	harmed	more	in	the	second	version.	These	theorists	say	that	the	
authorities’	intent	to	harm	her	will	probably	lead	them	to	do	things	like	confine	her	in	
harsher	conditions.	These	theorists	worry	that	the	intent	to	harm	can	affect	punishment	in	
the	same	way	and	that	this	might	make	punishment	impermissibly	harmful.	
Both	explanations	have	important	problems.	The	first	appeals	to	a	controversial	
claim:	that	intentions	can	affect	permissibility	directly.	There’s	a	longstanding	debate	about	
whether	intentions	can	do	this.	Many	philosophers	think	not	(e.g.,	Scanlon	2008	and	those	
cited	in	Tadros	2011:	140	and	Wellman	2012:	382-3;	for	opposing	arguments	see	Tadros	
2011:	139-66).	They’d	reject	the	first	explanation	outright.	If	possible,	it	would	be	better	to	
explain	the	target	intuition	in	a	way	that	they	can	accept.	More	generally,	it	would	be	better	
to	explain	the	intuition	without	taking	sides	in	controversial	debates	like	this.	
	
The	second	explanation	is	too	speculative.	Consider:	we	can	intend	to	inflict	varying	
degrees	of	harm.	Even	if	it’s	plausible	to	say	that	intending	to	inflict	lots	of	harm	is	likely	to	
make	a	harmful	act	more	harmful	than	it	would	be	if	it	wasn’t	intended	to	inflict	harm,	it’s	
not	obviously	plausible	to	say	this	about	intending	to	inflict	a	little	harm.	If	the	authorities	
in	the	above	case	confine	the	dangerous	person	and	intend	to	harm	her	only	a	little,	it’s	not	
obvious	that	they’ll	likely	harm	her	more	than	they	would	if	they	didn’t	intend	to	harm	her	
at	all.	So	the	problem	raised	by	the	second	explanation	isn’t	obviously	a	problem	for	
punishment	per	se.	It	might	just	be	a	problem	for	punishment	that’s	intended	to	be	
especially	harmful.	
I’m	not	saying	that	these	problems	are	insurmountable,	but	I	worry	that	they	are.	If	
the	standard	explanations	were	the	only	ways	to	explain	the	target	intuition,	then	anyone	
who	shares	my	worries	should	doubt	the	intuition.	The	standard	explanations	aren’t	the	
only	options	here,	though.	We	can	see	this	if	we	think	about	why	so	many	advocates	of	the	
target	intuition	endorse	these	explanations:	they	do	so	because	they	assume	that	justifying	
punishment	is	only	a	matter	of	showing	that	it’s	permissible.	Michael	Zimmerman	puts	the	
assumption	like	this.	
I	am	concerned	with	what	it	would	take	for	punishment	to	be	morally	justified.	…To	
say	that	an	act	is	morally	justified	is	to	say	that	it	is	not	morally	wrong,	that	to	
perform	it	is	at	least	morally	permissible	and	perhaps	even	morally	required.	
(Zimmerman	2011:	23,	25;	cf.	159-65;	cf.	Berman	2008:	265-7,	Boonin	2008:	ix,	1-2,	
28-9,	Sayre-McCord	2001:	502-3,	Tadros	2011:	1-4)	
My	explanation	rejects	this	assumption	(I’ll	say	why	shortly).	Here’s	my	explanation.	
	
Intentions	Matter	Regardless	of	Permissibility:	Justifying	punishment	requires	
showing	that	hard	treatment	is	permissible	and	that	inflicting	it	with	the	intent	to	
harm	is	morally	acceptable.	The	intent	to	harm	makes	punishment	especially	hard	
to	justify	because	it’s	a	presumptively	very	bad	intention	for	an	act	even	if	the	act	is	
permissible.	
My	explanation	avoids	the	problems	with	the	standard	explanations	because	it	doesn’t	say	
that	intentions	can	affect	permissibility.	
Next,	I’ll	defend	my	explanation.	
3.	Explanations	–	Part	II	
Start	with	my	claim	that	the	intent	to	harm	is	a	presumptively	very	bad	intention	for	
an	act	even	if	the	act	is	permissible.	To	see	why	this	is	true,	consider	a	case.	
Carrier:	Patient	is	a	carrier	of	a	very	dangerous	and	highly	infectious	disease.	
Governor	quarantines	her.	This	protects	others	from	catching	the	disease	from	her	
and	it	harms	her,	e.g.,	by	severely	restricting	her	liberty.	Governor	does	this	with	the	
intent	to	harm	her.	
There’s	a	strong	reason	to	quarantine	Patient.	So	Governor	might	be	acting	permissibly.	But	
even	if	he	is,	his	intention	is	still	very	bad.	He	acts	culpably	and	viciously	by	acting	on	it	–	
viciously	in	the	sense	of	manifesting	vices	like	contempt,	cruelty,	and	malice.	His	intention	
is	bad	in	these	ways	because	it’s	a	deeply	inappropriate	attitude	toward	harm.	It	treats	the	
fact	that	his	act	will	harm	Patient	as	a	reason	to	perform	the	act	when	it’s	a	reason	not	to	
(cf.	Nagel	1986:181-2,	Yaffe	2016:	165).4	These	claims	generalize.	The	intent	to	harm	is	
 
4	Note	that	which	vices	are	present	in	such	cases	will	depend	on	why	this	is	a	motivating	reason.	For	example,	
if	Governor	intends	harm	for	its	own	sake,	that	seems	cruel	and	malicious.	And	if	he	intends	harm	because	he	
thinks	that	his	act	will	have	good	effects	in	virtue	of	its	harmfulness	–	e.g.,	he	thinks	that	the	harm	will	get	
	
almost	always	a	deeply	inappropriate	attitude	toward	harm.	This	is	because	the	fact	that	an	
act	will	harm	someone	is	almost	always	a	reason	not	to	perform	it,	even	if	it’s	permissible.	
So	part	of	my	explanation	is	true:	the	intent	to	harm	is	a	presumptively	very	bad	intention	
for	an	act	even	if	the	act	is	permissible.	
	 You	might	object	that	these	claims	don’t	support	the	target	intuition	because	
Governor	could	still	be	acting	culpably	and	viciously	even	if	he	doesn’t	intend	to	harm	
Patient,	e.g.,	if	he’s	merely	indifferent	to	her	being	harmed.5	This	objection	is	mistaken.	
Other	things	equal,	acting	with	the	intent	to	harm	seems	to	make	Governor	more	culpable	
than	mere	indifference	would.	It	also	seems	to	manifest	certain	vices	to	a	greater	degree,	
e.g.,	it	seems	to	express	more	contempt	and	it	seems	more	cruel.	And	it	seems	like	it	can	
manifest	distinct	and	especially	bad	vices	like	malice.	Again,	these	claims	generalize.	Other	
things	equal,	intending	harm	seems	worse	than	mere	indifference	to	harm.	So	my	claims	do	
support	the	target	intuition.	
	 The	other	part	of	my	explanation	says	that	justifying	punishment	requires	showing	
that	inflicting	hard	treatment	with	the	intent	to	harm	is	morally	acceptable.	My	argument	
for	this	starts	with	the	claim	that	some	attitudes	can	be	justified	or	unjustified.	Pamela	
Hieronymi	plausibly	defends	this	claim	as	follows.	
Certain	attitudes	are	subject	to	direct	rational	criticism:	one	can	be	asked	to	give	
one’s	reasons	for	them.	One	can	be	asked	why	one	believes,	intends,	resents,	
supposes,	or	imagines…	Such	requests	for	justification	can,	in	principle,	be	satisfied.	
(Hieronymi	2005:	454)	
 
others	to	take	more	care	to	avoid	infection	–	then	that	seems	cruel	to	Patient	and	seems	to	express	contempt	
for	her	(because	it	suggests	that	using	her	in	this	way	is	acceptable).	
5	Thanks	to	a	referee	here.	
	
There	are	no	relevant	differences	between	these	attitudes	and	the	intent	to	harm.	So	it	can	
be	justified	or	unjustified	too.6	This	has	implications	for	punishment’s	justifiability:	because	
punishment	is	intentionally	harmful,	its	justifiability	depends	on	the	justifiability	of	the	
intent	to	harm.	If	the	intent	to	harm	someone	is	unjustified,	so	is	punishing	her.	
You	might	object	that	this	argument	is	invalid,	that	the	justifiability	of	intentions	
entails	nothing	about	the	justifiability	of	acts.	This	objection	fails.	It	overlooks	the	fact	that	
some	types	of	act	are	partly	constituted	by	certain	intentions	and	that	acts	of	punishment	
are	like	this	(Boonin	2008:	9	and	Sverdlik	1996:	347	give	examples	of	other	such	acts).	
Being	intentionally	harmful	is	just	part	of	what	it	is	for	an	act	to	be	an	act	of	punishment.	
Such	acts	can	plausibly	be	said	to	be	justified	only	when	their	constitutive	intentions	are,	at	
least	in	one	sense	of	justified.	An	act	is	justified	in	this	sense	only	if	it’s	broadly	morally	
acceptable,	e.g.,	not	wrong	or	culpable	or	vicious.	This	is	a	perfectly	legitimate	sense	of	
justified	–	and	an	important	one,	as	I’ll	soon	argue.	
Next,	I’ll	discuss	some	implications	of	my	discussion	and	some	more	objections.	
4.	Implications	and	Objections	
My	discussion	has	at	least	two	important	implications.	First,	some	attempts	to	
justify	punishment	are	consistent	with	the	claim	that	punishment	is	deeply	morally	
objectionable.	Second,	some	arguments	against	punishment	can	be	significantly	
strengthened.	I’ll	elaborate.	
Regarding	the	first	implication,	some	attempts	to	justify	punishment	only	argue	that	
hard	treatment	is	permissible	(e.g.,	Wellman	2012:	371-6; Sher	2009:	764	gives	other	
examples).	Because	of	this,	they	don’t	suffice	to	justify	punishment	in	my	sense	of	justify	–	
 
6	Again,	I	mean	morally	justified,	i.e.,	I’m	concerned	with	moral	reasons	specifically.	
	
remarkably,	they’re	consistent	with	the	claim	that	punishment	is	never	morally	acceptable	
and	that	punishers	always	act	culpably	and	viciously.	Anyone	who	wants	to	use	these	
arguments	to	justify	punishment	must	combine	them	with	arguments	that	defend	the	
intent	to	harm.7	In	light	of	this,	advocates	of	these	attempted	justifications	–	and	
punishment	theorists	more	generally	–	should	think	more	carefully	about	how	if	at	all	the	
intent	to	harm	can	be	justified.	
Regarding	the	second	implication,	some	punishment	theorists	are	abolitionists:	they	
appeal	to	the	target	intuition	and	the	standard	explanations	for	it	to	argue	that	punishment	
is	unjustified	(e.g.,	Boonin	2008:	15-16,	28-9,	234,	Zimmerman	2011:	159-65;	cf.	Sayre-
McCord	2001:	507).	Earlier,	I	outlined	some	objections	to	these	explanations.	Abolitionist	
arguments	that	appeal	to	the	target	intuition	and	rely	on	these	explanations	are	vulnerable	
to	the	objections.	The	arguments	can	avoid	the	objections	by	appealing	to	my	explanation	
instead.	So	we	shouldn’t	be	too	quick	to	dismiss	these	arguments	on	the	basis	of	objections	
to	the	standard	explanations.	
I’ll	conclude	by	considering	two	more	objections	to	my	arguments.	The	first	says	
that	my	explanation	for	the	target	intuition	doesn’t	actually	support	it	because	it	might	be	
false	even	if	my	explanation	is	true.	To	see	the	alleged	problem	here,	recall	the	intuition:	
the	intent	to	harm	makes	punishment	especially	hard	to	justify.	And	recall	my	explanation,	
in	brief:	justifying	punishment	requires	justifying	both	hard	treatment	and	the	intent	to	
harm.	This	explanation	doesn’t	rule	out	the	possibility	that	these	things	can	be	justified	in	
 
7	This	concern	might	apply	to	many	attempts	to	justify	punishment.	Boonin	argues	that	many	attempts	don’t	
show	that	acting	with	the	intent	to	harm	is	permissible	(Boonin	2008:	35,	117-19,	141-43,	147-49,	170-71,	
205-207).	His	arguments	can	be	reframed	in	terms	of	acceptability.	See	below.	
	
the	same	way.	If	they	can	be,	the	objection	says,	then	the	intent	to	harm	won’t	make	
punishment	especially	hard	to	justify.8	
This	objection	fails	because	the	previous	sentence	is	false.	To	see	why,	consider	the	
reasons	that	might	justify	hard	treatment	and	the	intent	to	harm.	There	seem	to	be	a	
variety	of	reasons	that	can	justify	hard	treatment.9	But	cases	like	Carrier	seem	to	show	that	
some	of	these	reasons	can’t	justify	the	intent	to	harm	at	all	or	can’t	justify	it	as	often	as	they	
can	justify	hard	treatment.10	This	apparent	fact	about	the	intent	to	harm	can	explain	why	it	
makes	punishment	especially	hard	to	justify	even	if	it	can	be	justified	in	the	same	way	as	
hard	treatment.	So	the	first	objection	fails.	
The	second	objection	says	that	it	doesn’t	much	matter	–	that	there’s	not	much	
reason	to	care	–	whether	punishment	is	justified	in	my	sense,	so	long	as	we	can	permissibly	
use	hard	treatment	to	punish.	You	might	even	say	that	Carrier	suggests	as	much,	that	
Governor’s	bad	intention	doesn’t	much	matter	given	the	obvious	reason	to	think	that	he	
acts	permissibly:	the	fact	that	his	act	is	necessary	to	avert	a	grave	threat.11	
Two	points	in	reply.	First,	the	objection	is	wrong	about	Carrier.	The	fact	that	
Governor’s	act	is	necessary	to	avert	a	grave	threat	doesn’t	show	that	his	bad	intention	
doesn’t	much	matter.	At	most,	this	fact	just	shows	that	something	about	his	act	matters	
more	than	his	bad	intention	and	that	performing	the	act	with	the	bad	intention	is	better	
 
8	Thanks	to	a	referee	for	this	objection.	
9	For	example,	if	hard	treatment	has	very	good	consequences	–	e.g.,	that	outweigh	a	persons’	rights	or	
interests	–	that	can	help	to	make	it	permissible.	And	if	it	doesn’t	violate	a	person’s	rights	–	e.g.,	if	he	waives	or	
forfeits	rights	against	it	–	that	can	help	to	make	it	permissible	(cf.	Wellman	2012).	
10	To	illustrate,	the	hard	treatment	in	Carrier	seems	justified	partly	because	it	has	very	good	consequences.	
And	maybe	it’s	justified	partly	because	it	doesn’t	violate	Patient’s	rights.	But	these	considerations	don’t	justify	
Governor’s	intention.	At	the	least,	this	suggests	that	these	considerations	can’t	justify	the	intent	to	harm	as	
often	as	they	can	justify	hard	treatment.	I	suspect	that	good	consequences	can	justify	the	intent	to	harm	in	
certain	special	cases	and	that	facts	about	rights	never	can,	but	I	won’t	explore	these	issues	here.	
11	Thanks	to	two	referees	for	this	worry	about	Carrier.	
	
than	not	performing	it	at	all.	This	is	consistent	with	the	claim	that	his	bad	intention	still	
matters	in	important	ways	and	that	performing	the	act	without	the	bad	intention	would	
have	even	better.	
	 Second,	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	that	Governor’s	intention	–	and	the	intent	to	
harm	more	generally	–	do	matter	in	important	ways.	Some	remarks	of	P.F.	Strawson’s	help	
to	show	why.	
The	central	commonplace	that	I	want	to	insist	on	is	the	very	great	importance	that	
we	attach	to	the	attitudes	and	intentions	towards	us	of	other	human	beings	…	[I	
want	to]	emphasize	how	much	we	actually	mind,	how	much	it	matters	to	us,	
whether	the	actions	of	other	people	…	reflect	attitudes	towards	us	of	goodwill,	
affection,	or	esteem	on	the	one	hand	or	contempt,	indifference,	or	malevolence	on	
the	other.	(Strawson	2008:	5-6;	cf.	Zimmerman	2011:	162-4)	
Strawson’s	point	is	just	that	we	care	a	lot	about	people’s	attitudes	and	intentions.	But	I	
would	add	that	we	have	good	reasons	to	care.	To	see	this,	consider	Carrier	again.	Even	if	
Governor	acts	permissibly,	his	bad	intention	still	matters	in	several	ways.	Here	are	some.	
It’s	deeply	disrespectful	to	Patient.	It	justifies	attitudes	towards	Governor	like	resentment,	
indignation,	and	blame	–	as	well	as	guilt	and	shame	on	his	part.	And	it	can	justify	acts	that	
express	these	attitudes,	e.g.,	criticizing	him	and	voting	against	him	–	as	well	as	apologizing	
and	resigning	on	his	part.	These	claims	generalize.	Even	when	hard	treatment	is	
permissible,	whether	it’s	unjustifiably	intended	to	harm	still	matters	in	important	ways.	So	
the	second	objection	fails	too.12	
 
12	I’ve	focused	on	persons	who	intend	harm,	but	there	are	arguably	cases	where	collectives	like	states	intend	
harm.	You	might	wonder	if	my	points	apply	in	such	cases.	For	reasons	to	think	that	they	do	see	Tollefsen	
(2003).	Thanks	to	a	referee	for	raising	this	issue	and	directing	me	to	Tollefson’s	paper.	
	
Conclusion	
The	target	intuition	says	that	the	intent	to	harm	makes	punishment	especially	hard	
to	justify.	The	standard	explanations	for	this	intuition	are	problematic.	So	I’ve	defended	
another	one.13	
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